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Case No. 7633 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
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PANY, VINCENT-PETERSON CON-
STRUCTION C01t1PANY, GRONE-
i\1AN & COMPANY, YOUNG & SMITH 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, U·TAH 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
Petitioners & Appellants, 
-vs.-
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, and THE BOARD OF RE-
VIEW, APPEALS REFEREE and 
CLAIMS SUPERVISOR of its DE-
PARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT' 
SECURITY, 
Resp1ondents & Appellees. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
OLOF NELSON CONSTRUCTION CO~I­
PANY, VINCENT-PETERSON CON-
STRUCTION COMPANY, GRONE-
MAN & COMPANY, YOUNG & S.MITH 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, UTAH 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
Petitioners & Appellants, 
-vs.-
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, and THE BOARD OF RE-
VIEW, APPEALS REFEREE and 
CLAIMS :SUPERVISOR of its DE-
pARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT 
SECURITY, 
Respondents & Appellees. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
NA·TURE OF CASE 
Case No. 7633 
The Petitioners filed an appeal with the Industrial 
Commission of Utah, Unemployment Compensation AP-
peals Referee contesting the payment of unemployment 
compensation to eight claimants covering a period from 
June 2, 1950 to June 8, 1950. The Claimants were em-
ployees of the Peti·tioners during this period. 
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The Petitioners contended that the Claimants were 
on strike within the· meaning of Chapter 42-2a-5 (d) (1) 
Utah Code Annotated 1943, as amended, the Employment 
Security Act. 
The Appeals Referee ruled that the eight claimants 
were not on strike, that the stoppage of work was not due 
to a strike at the factory or establishment where claim-
ants were last employed, and that benefit payments would 
be 'allowed for the period in question. 
In accordance with 42-2a-10 Utah Code Annotated 
1943 as ·arnende~d, the deeision of the Appeals Referee was 
appea1ed to the Board uf Review of the Industrial Com-
mission of Utah. Without granting oral arguments oral-
lowing the submission ·o:f brief 'On appeal 'Said Board 
of Revi·ew ruled: ''In view of the fact that there have 
been two previous decisions, it is the, decision of this 
Board of Review that any further hearing on appeal 
be and is hereby denie'd. '' 
Petitioners, as emplo)Tier contributors under the Em-
ployment Security ~ct then petitioned the· Supreme 
Court of Utah to compel respondent Commission et. al. 
to show cause why its decision awarding henefits to 
claimants herein, should not be vacated and to remove 
from the Petiti!one:rs accounts maintained by the Re-
spondents he·rein all charge's ma:de against the said ac-
counts on ·aooount ~of benefits tp1aid to any of said claim-
ants during the period of the strike herein involved to wit 
June 2, 1950 to June 8, 1950 inclusive. 
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3 
THE FACT'S 
Each of the Petitioners is a General Contractor, 
engaged in General Building, Highway or Heavy con-
struction business in the State of Utah. Each of said 
Petitioners employ construction workers who are mem-
bers of local American Federation of Labor unions. 
All of the eight. claimants (Joseph B. Allman, Cor-
nell B. Cameron, Owen E. Cameron, George E. Cloward, 
Harold L. Garrard, Charlie Martinez, Reed H. Nielson 
and Ronald Murray Ross) are members of one of the six 
basic craft local unions., namely ( 1) International Hod 
Carriers, Building and Common Laborers Union, (2) 
United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of 
America, (3) International Union of Operating Engi-
neers, ( 4) International Brotherhood of Te·amsters 
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of Ameri-ca, ( 5) 
International Association of Bridge, Structural and 
Ornamental Iron Workers, and (6) Operative Plasterers 
and Cement Finishers International Association, here-
inafter referred to as the Unions, (R-2)*. The Unions 
are the recognized bargaining representatives of the 
Claimants (R-13) and each of said Claimants were at 
the times herein mentioned employees of one of the peti-
tioners- (R-7 Department's Exhibit N·o. 1, Paragraph 
#7) (R-10 Appellant's Exhibit No.3, Labor Agreement, 
See Article II thereof). 
* R-Refers to Reporters Transcript. 
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4 
The Petitioners. are members of the Associated Gene·ral 
Contractors of America, Intermountain Branch, (R-2) 
a "legally organized Trade Association composed of ap-
proximately seventy-five members and having as its 
territory the State of Utah, hereinafter referred to as 
the Association. The Pe'titioners are signators and 
legally bound under the terms of a labor agreement dated 
August 12, 1949 and negotiated by the Association as the 
designated collective bargaining representative 'Of Peti-
tioners. (R-7 Department's Exhibit No.1 Paragraph#7) 
(See R-lO.Appellant's Exhibit No. 3 Labor Agreement, 
Article II thereof quoted as follows)-
"ARTICLE II 
BARGAINING RECOGNITION 
"A. The Contractors recognize the Unions 
signatory hereto as the collective bargaining rep-
resenta;tives of their employees over whom the 
Unions have jurisdiction. 
"B. The Unions hereby recognize and ac-
knowle!dge that the Associated General Contrac-
tors of America, Intermountain Branch, include 
in its membership a majority of the individual 
Contractors in the general, highway, building and 
heavy construction industry and said contr,actors 
are performing the greater percentage of work 
therein, and by reason of such facts, the Unions 
hereby recognize the Associated General Con-
tractors of America, Intermountain Bran~h, as 
the collective, bargaining representa;tive fior its 
membership in the gener,al, highway, building and 
heavy construction industry in the, te:rritory sub-
ject to this Agreement. 
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''C. This Agreement shall not apply to ex-
ecutives, civil engineers, arrd their helpers, super-
intendents, assistant superintendents, master 
mechanics, timekeepers, messenger boys, office 
workers, confidential employe~es or any employees 
of the Contractors above the rank of craft fore-
man. 
''D. The wage rates, working conditions, 
·and hours of employment, herein provided have 
been negotiated by the Unions exclusively with 
the representatives of the Contractors. The 
Unions agree that in the event that during the life 
of this agreement it should make any agreement 
with any person, firm, association or corporation 
providing wage rates, working conditions and 
hours of employment more favorable to s~aid other 
person, firm, association, or corporation than is 
provided in this agreement for Contractors, then 
and in that event any member of Associated 
General Contractors of America, Intermountain 
Branch, engaging in work of the ty1pe covered by 
any such agreement shall have the benefits of any 
such more favorable wage rates, working condi-
tions, and 'hours of employment when performing 
such work.'' 
The said Contractors Association was organized in 
1922 and since that time has repreS"ented its memhers in 
collective bargaining matters with the said unions (R-11 
Appellants exhibit No. 4 ''Constitution ·and By Laws, 
Page 13 & 14) (R-7 Department's Exhibit No. 1 Stipula-
tion of Fact). The collective' bargaining r'elpres·entatives 
of the contractors and workmen, respectively, have for 
the past several years negotiated a so~call'ed ''master'' 
or ''industry-wide'' contract covering the hours, wages 
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6 
and working conditi·ons for construction workers in the 
State of Utah. All of the labor negotiations leading to 
the labor contr·aets negotiate·d over the past several years 
were conducted exclusively by the Association and the 
U ni·orns, and the said labor contracts, when executed, im-
posed identical conditions of wages, hours and working 
conditions upon each of the petitioners and were appli-
cable ·to all n1emhers of the· aforesaid six basic cr·aft 
A.F.L. Unions. (R-7 Department's Exhibit No.1, Stipu-
lation of Fact) (R-22) 
On August 12, 1949 the current labor agreement was 
executed by and between the Unions and the Association. 
The term of this labor agreement was two years, from 
AuguS't 12, 1949 to. June 1, 1951. This ·agreement con-
tained a :clause to permit opening for Imgortiation of 
wages only on June 1, 1950. (R-10 Appellant's Exhibit 
No.3) On February 27, 1950, the Secretary of the Build-
ing Trades Council of Utah repTesenting the Unions 
advised the Association that in a0cordance with Article 
IX Section A of the Labor Agreement, n'otices were given 
on behalf of the Unions of their desire to negotiate an 
increase in wages only. (R-7 Department's Exhibit No. 
1) The labor agreement by its terms had not expired, 
(R-10, 21) (R-45) and the Unions did not demand a 
change in any 'of the provisions of the agreement othell' 
than wages. Thereafter, on March 9, the Ass·ocia;tion re-
quested a collective harga:ining meeting with the Unions. 
By an exchange of ~orreslpondence between the Asso-
ciation and the Unions, the first collective bargaining 
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7 
meeting was set for April 4, 1950. The sooond such meet-
ing ()C(?urred April 26, 1950. A tl1ird such meeting o~­
curred :May 26, 1950. The bargaining reached an im-
passe but notwithstanding two further m·eetings were 
held, one on ~lay 29 ·and the other on ~lay 31. No agree-
ment as to wages was reached by ~lay 31, 1950, and there-
after on June 1, the Unions notified the Association that 
pickets would be placed at the Ellis W. Barker Company 
Professional Building job in Salt Lake City and the Earl 
S. P·aul Company job in Ogden. Thereafter, on June 2, 
1950, ·such picketing (strike ootion) did commence on 
these two specific jobs, and by this ·ruction all work 
s·topped and ·all workmen refused to work. The Unions 
had been no,tified during the course of the nego ... 
tiations both ·by letter (R-7 Department's. Exhibit 
No. 1). and by newspaper articles that a strike 
or a picket line appearing on any construction project 
of any member of the Association who was a signator to 
the labor agreement would be regarded as a picket and 
a strike against the entire Association as the recognized 
bargaining unit. (R-11, 16, 17, 18 & 19) (R-35 & 36·) (R-
38, 39) The !picket lines 'appeared on only two of the 
members of the 'bargaining unit and between June 2, 
1950, and June 5, 1950, all other members of the Asso-
ciation who were signators rto the Labor Agreement 
numbering approximately seventy 8ignator members 
closed dorwn their construction projects ·and laid the 
workmen off their jobs. 'The strike was regarded as a 
strike 'against the bargaining unit. (R-7 Department's 
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Exhibit No. 1) (R-16-19, 22, 23) (R-50, 51) (R-56) The 
Claimants became unemployed because of this action. The 
pieket line around the two aforesaid construction projects 
was 0omposed of members of the Unions. 
At no time during any of the negotia,tions did the 
Unions make any separate proposals to any individual 
memhe·r of the Association ( R-20, 48) and at all times 
all the said prolposals were made to the Association only 
and for the purpose of securing increased wages for each 
and all of the members of the Unions including the 
Claimants. (R-23) 
Subsequent to said strike action, meetings were held 
under the auspices of the United States Labor Concilia-
tion Service and the Industrial Commission of Utah 
between the Association and the Unions rand during none 
of ·the said meetings or negotiations were any individual 
proposals made to any individual member of the Asso-
ciation or was rany ind~cation given by the Unions that 
the said wage controversy could be settled 'by ra separate 
wage settlement with etither of the two· struck companies, 
the Ellis W. Barker Oompany or the Earl S. Paul Com-
pany. (R-21) As :a matter of fact there was a slow down 
on some jobs during the period of negotiations and just 
prior to the shutdown. (R-23, 24, 25) (R-57, 58) The said 
strike was en:ded on or about June 7, 1950, ~as a result 
of an agreement to increa;se. wages only in the said 
Mruster Labor Agreement oif' August 12, 1949. This wage 
increase affected all construction workers and included 
the Clraimants herein. ( R-23, 64, 66, 97) 
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THE ISSUE 
Are the Claimants entitled to unemployment com-
pensation when they became unemployed because of 
their strike against the bargaining unitY 
Claimants were m·embers of the Unions. 
Claimants appointed the Unions to represent them 
for purposes of bargaining. 
Claimants received an increase in wage as a result 
of their strike action. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I-THE LABOR AGREEMENT DATED AUGUST 
12, 1949, WAS BINDING UPON THE ASSOCIATION (PETI-
TIONERS) AND UNIONS AT ALL TIMES HEREIN AND 
DURING THE PERIOD OF THE STRIKE. 
By the terms of the Labor Agreement o_f August 12, 
1949 the-parties were legally bound to recognize the bar-
gaining unit until ·the expiration of the agreement in 
June 1951. This bargaining unit could not be dissolved 
short of breach of contract. (See Article II of Labor 
Agreement, supra.) Respondents contend fuat the 'Strike 
dissolved ·fue bargaining unit 'and because of thi's fact 
re,cognition by the respective parties under Article II 
of the agreement was of no legal effect. The parties 
regarded the Labor Agreement enforceable in every re-
spect but wages. By the terms of the agreement the 
recognition clause was not voided by the strike and it 
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10 
logically foillows, that a ·strike ~against this legally recog-
nized bargaining unit during June of 1950 was economic 
action again'st the entire uni't. 
The Unions during the strike did not deny recogni-
tion of the Associa:tion as the bargaining unit. This same 
legal status would pe:rhaps rrot obtain were the two 
parties renegotiating all of the terms of the agre·ement 
at the expiration of said Agreement. 
The Respondents take the position that the entire 
contract was being renegotiated at the time of the strike 
and, therefore, the bargaining unit was dissolved at the 
time sai'd strike occurred. 
The two struck companies were by contract legally 
bound 'to recognize the bargaining unit and could only 
legally negotiate through the recognized unit. This same 
condition ·existed for all signators to the Agreement both 
contractors :and Unions and involved Claimants as mem-
bers of the Unions. 
A strike against one member of the bargaining unit 
was fuererore a strike 'against the entire unit. The 
claimants held membership in this unit ·and were aooord-
ingly ineligible to re~eive uneiD!ployment 'benefits because 
the strike involved their grade, class ·or group at the 
es'tablisbments where they were last employed and the 
strike was fomented hy workers of an employer who 
were partie's to such p:Jan to foment the ·strike. (See 
42-·2a-5 (d) (1) U.C.A. 1943 'as 'amended infra.)t 
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POINT II-A STRIKE AGAINST TWO MEMBERS OF 
A BARGAINING UNIT IS A STRIKE AGAINST THE 
ENTIRE BARGAINING UNIT AND CLAIMANTS WHO 
ARE INTERESTED AND BENEFIT BY THE STRIKE ARE 
OF THE GRADE, CLASS OR GROUP AND INELIGIBLE FOR 
COMPENSATION WITHIN THE MEANING OF 42-2a-5 (d) 
(1), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1943, EMPLOYMENT SE-
CURITY ACT. 
42-2a-5 Provides : 
''An individual shall be ineligible for benefits 
or for purposes of establishing a waiting peri'od: 
'' (d) For any week in which it i'S found by 
the commission that his unemployment is due to a 
stoppage of work which exists becauS'e of a strike 
involving his grade, class, or group of workers a.t 
the factory or establishment at which he is or 
was last employed. 
"(I) If the commission, upon invesrtigation, 
shall find that a strike ha;s been fomented by a 
worker of am,y employer, none 'of the workers of 
the grade, class, or group of workers of the indi-
vidual who is fo-und to be a party to such plan, 
or agreement to foment a strike, shall be eligible 
for benefits; tprovided, however, that if the Com-
nriss~on, upon investigation, shall find that such 
strike is caused by the failure or refusal of any 
employer to conform to the provi·sions of any law 
of the State of Uta;h or of the United States per-
taining to hours, wages, or other conditions of 
work, such strike shall not render the workers in-
·eligible for benefits.'' 
The unemployment compensation statutes o.f all 48 
states contain provisions disqualifying claimants whose 
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unemployment is the result of a labor dispute. While 
most labor dispute disqualification clauses are made ap-
plicable to labor disputes, several use different phra.se-
ology: 
California-'' (trade dispute)'' 
Colorado-'' ('strike)'' 
Kentucky-'' (strike or other bona fide labor dis-
pute)'' 
New York-'' ('Strike, l·ockout or industrial contro-
versy)'' 
Rhode Island-" (strike or industrial controversy)" 
Utah-" (strike involving grade, class or group of 
workers)'' 
TheS'e differences, however, have not proven signi-
ficant even where disqualification is limited by statute 
to strike. SandovlJial v. Indlustrial Commission, (Colorado) 
130 P (2d) 930; Block Coal 0o11'1llAG!I'I!JJ v. U.M.W., (Ten-
neS'see) 148 'S.W. (2d) 364; Miners v. Hix, (West Vir-
ginia) 17 S.E. (2d) 810. 
A strike is defined 'as follows by the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act of 1947: 
''·The term strike includes any strike or other 
concerted stoppage of work by employees (includ-
ing the s!toppage by reason of the expiration of a 
~oUective bargaining agreement) and a concerted 
slowdown :or o'ther concerted interrup:ti'on of op-
e'rations. by employees.'' 
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13 
A labor dispute is defined by the National Labor 
Relations Act as amen'ded as follows: 
''The term labor dispute includes a contro'-
versy concerning terms, tenure or c:ond~tions o.f 
e1nployment, or concerning the association or rep-
resentation of pers'ons in negotiating, fixing, 
maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange 
terms or conditions of employment, regardless 
of whether the disputants stand in the proxim'ate 
relation of employer and employee.'' 
A strike is the outgrowth of a labor dispute and in 
a sense the terms "strike" and "labor dispute" are 
similar. A strike only occurs after the existence of a 
labor dispute. 
In recent years the increas~d frequency of large 
scale industrial controversies has sharply accentuated 
the proiblem of the applicability of disqualification pro-
visions to claimants wh01se unemployment, while resulting 
from a labor dispute orr strike is wholly involuntary. 
Claimants in the instant case received the benefit of the 
wage increase· resulting f'rom their strike, their duly 
appointed representatives ealled the: strike against the 
two members of the bargaining unit, and for that reason 
their unempl'O~ent was, perhaps., not involuntary. 
The most commonly advanced justification of the 
labor dispute 'd.'isqualific:a;tion is that no rp1erson should 
be :allowed to receive benefits while unemployed as a 
result of his oiWn voluntary a,cts. D-epartment of Indus-
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trial ReZatvovrvs v. Pesnell, (Alabama) 199 Southern 726; 
Swunde.rs v. MarylJa;n;d Uwemployment Compensation 
Bola'rd,, 53 .AJtl. (2nd) 579; Deshler Bro·om Factory v. 
Kinney, (Nebraska) 2 N.W. (2d) 332 and 336. 
The Unions, in this case ordered a strike o.f only two 
construction firms hoping to he secure in the lmowle'dge 
tha:t such 'a cours·e would as effectively induce a complete 
work stoppage as would a strike against all members of 
the bargaining unit and that state benefi1t payments of 
all non-striking members would appreciably lessen the 
drain upon the: union '•s treasury by requiring the union 
to finance only a small scale strike. As a matter of fact, 
the Unions knew and had been notified several times 
during nego1tiations that a strike against one would be 
considered a strike against all. This matter is discussed 
in Chrysler v. Smith, 298 N.W. 87. In re 8t. PO!Ul & 
TaJcoma Lumber Company 110 P. (2d) 877; Spielman v. 
Industrial Commission of Wisoonsin, 295 N.W. 1. 
The statutes (including the Utah statute) uniformly 
provide that claimants will not come within the disquali-
fication clause me,rely hecaus·e a labor dispute or strike 
exists, but will be ineligible for benefits only if the dis-
pute bears a causal relationship to their unemployment. 
The question of disqualification of empiJ.oyees of a 
branch plant of a corporrution located in another city but 
affiliated with an installati:on under separrute labor 
agreement where a labor dispute occurred has be·en 
litigated :only once, and in tha:t case affiliates were re-
garded as a single employer and the claimants disquali-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
fied, Spi.elman r. Indu.strial Commission o1 Wisconsin, 
295 N."\V. 1. All of the statutes in the United S1ta:tes, in-
cluding Utah, which exempt claimants from the operation 
of labor dispute disqualification clau::;es universally eon-
tain exen1ption upon their non-participation in the dis-
pute. See Utah Statute supra: " ... group of workers 
of the individual who is found to be a party to such a 
plan ... '' Even statutes which without any further quali-
fication allow benefits to claimants ·who do not belong 
to a grade or class of employees any of whose members 
are participating in financing, or directly interested in 
a labor dispute, implicitly embody a requirement of non-
participation, since a claimant who is himself participat-
ing in the labor dispute will nooessarily be a member of 
such a grade or group. It is clear, for e)rample·, that dis-
qualification as a participant may extend nolt only to 
persons refusing to work because of their own labor dis-
pute, but alsn to those who iperf'oTm some other voluntary 
act making the dispute of others their own. Barnes v. 
U.C.B. (Pennsylvania Superior Court) 33 Atl. (2d) 
258, 1943. 
Even in jurisdictions whose statutes embody excep-
tions to the labor dispute disqualifications, a claimant, 
although not participating in the dispute, cannot bring 
himself within these exceptions. if he is direetly intel"ested 
in it. (See the Utah s'tatute aforesaid). When the, suc-
ces·s of a labor dispute would have inured to the benefit 
of the· claimant in the fo:rm of higher wages., whether 
claimant was Union or non-Union, the plaimant is gener-
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ally held to be directly interested in the dispute, Huiet 
v. Boyd, (Ga. 1941) 13 S.E. (2d) 863; Cas'e 18222, 11 B.S. 
10-57, Illinois, (Ill. R 1948); Case No. 12589, 11 B.S. 
7-66, (Kansas R 1947). It is immaterial whether in fact 
the dispute has, been attend~d by success · or failure. 
Nobes v. U.C.C., (Michigan) 1946, 21 N.W. (2d) 820. 
It appears from unconflicting ·evidence taken by said 
Re:sponderrts, that the Claimants and each of them left 
their work for your Petitioners because 'Of -a wage dispute 
between your Petitioners :and their Unions, and because 
their Unions picketed two construction firms who were 
signators to their labor agreement and who weTe parties 
to their ~ollective bargaining unit, and Slaid Claimants 
and each of them thereafter continued out of work until 
June 8, 1950, by reason of the fact that the said wage 
dispute whi·ch fomented the ~strike was ~still in active 
progress in the es~ablis.hments im which they were last 
employed. The said Respondents, the Appeals Board 
and Board of Review thereof abused its discretion in that 
the decision to award benefits to the said Claimants was 
not ·supported by the findings, and the findings are no:t 
supported by the evidence, and upon legal conclusion 
which were and -are wholly erroneous. 
The Supreme Cou:r!t of Oalifornia in a case involving 
a simllar factual situation ruled on Beptembe~r 14, 1949 
that a strike :against one member of a collective bargain-
ing unit was -a strike against all members of the unit and 
accordingly claimants £or unemployment compensation 
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were ineligible 'to draw benefits during the period of the 
strike. McKiniey v. Californi.a Employment Stabiliza-
tion Commi.ssiovn, 209 Pac. (2d) 602. 
Section 56 of the California Unemployment Insur-
ance Act a:s amended provides: ''An individual is not 
eligible ror benefits for unemployment, and no such bene-
fits shall be ~payable to him under any of the following 
conditions: (a) If he left his work because of a trade 
dispute and for the period during which he continues out 
of work by reason o.f the foot that the tr;ade dispute is 
still in active progress in the establishment in which he is 
employed.'' 
Construing the terms ''trade dispute'' and ''·strike'' 
to be similar in meaning then ~t follows the Utah s:tatute 
and the Galifonria statute are closely related in meaning. 
For construction of the term ''establishment'' see 
Chrysler v. Smith, 298 N.W. 89 at page 91. 
In the Gali£ornia ~se, supra, the Un~on had been 
notified that a ·strike against one would be regarded as 
a strike against all. Thls same condition existed in the 
instant case. The !Supreme C'Ourt of California stated as. 
follows on page 304: 
''Either the union or an individual employ~r, 
at any time, could have bfloken off joint nego-
tia:tions and bargained with its •employees on an 
individual bas'is. But that course was not taken. 
At no time did the. union purport to be directing 
any action. solely 'against the Butte~r Cream plant; 
ins!tead, the union continued throughout to deal 
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directly with the ~ssociation for the purp'os·e of 
obtaining a new ma)s'ter contract. To say, there-
fo·re, that the a~t of striking the one plarrt did not 
shut down work in olther 1p~ants of the association 
which were subje;ct to the labor negotiations for 
the purpo·se of obtaining a master contract is 
wholly unroolistic ... 
''The vtolitional test established in Bo!dison 
Mfg. Co., v. Oalifornia Emp. Com., 17 Cal. 2d 321 
(109 P. 2d 935), was based upon the prin~iple that 
inrrocenlt victims of a trade dispute should not 
suffer loss of their unemployment insuranc.e 
rights." 
However the instant case is even stronger because 
not only was multiple ·a)sso·ciation wide bargaining con-
tinued and no demands made to the individual members 
of the asS'oci'ation, but 'all parties were contractually 
hound to continue to recognize each other until ·the expir-
ation date of the contract in 1951. 
In the M cK ilnley case, supra, the. court stated that 
there must be a direct causal connection between the 
trade 'dispute and the leaving of work. The evidence of 
causal :connection in the instant case is clear and un-
disputed. 
This court has sipoken on this subject and construed 
the applicable section 'Of ·our employment security act 
in the ease of Iron Workers Unio·YIJ v. The Industrial 
Commission, 104 Utah 242. Thi'Sr case involved two com-
peting unions where one union placed a pieket line around 
a plant in Provo and the memheTs of the other union 
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refused to cross said line and thereby became unem-
ployed. Justice :JicDonoug-h in construing 42-2a-5 (d) ( 1) 
U.C.A. 19-!3 and ruling on eligibility of daimants for 
unemployment cmnpensation in that case stated as fol-
lows: 
"·The members of the Iron Workers' Union 
contend that they are entitled to benefits for the 
time they lost by reason of the strike, even if the 
members of the S.W.O.C. cannot ~ollect any bene-
fits. They point out that they were n'ot permitted 
to vote on the strike; that !they had nothing to do 
with calling it, but that they were prevented from 
entering the plant by an effective picket line. 
They further contend that they were not o.f the 
grade, class, or group of worker:s which was in-
volved in the strike because they had no voice in 
negotiations and had no voice in dclermining 
wh~ther or not there would be a strike. In :f:act 
they claim they were opposed to the strike 'and 
should not be penalized by the acts beyond their 
control.'' 
(In the case at bar the claimants we·re members of 
the Unions involved in the strike, were not opposed to 
the picket lines, were benefited by recei~ng a wage in-
crease and were of the group of workers involve'd in 
the strike.)· 
Justice McDonough further states : 
''However, it must he remembered that the 
S.W.O.C. by virtue ·of winning the C!otnsent election 
became the sole bargaining agent for all of the 
employe·es, including members of the Iron 
Workers' Union.'' 
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(By way of further comment the Unions in the case 
at bar were bound hy contract as a unit for collective 
bargaining, and had a long experience of collective 
bargaining with the Associa:tion.) 
Justice McDonough in construing the applicable 
Utah statute further stated: 
''If a strike involves his 'grade, class oT 
group' of workers, an employee is ineligible for 
unemployment benefits when stoppage of work is 
'caused' by members thereof.'' 
(N·ote that the court refers Ito members.) 
''. . . A strike involves the 'grn.de, clas'S or 
group,' of an employee witllin the meaning of the 
statute if ·the dispute which results. in the strike 
is with r~ference to wages, hours o:r conditions of 
employment of a group •orf which he is a member. 
True, a 'cla:ss, grade or group' may be coexten-
sive with a particular union membership, but !this 
is not :rieces'sarily so. In the instant case the mem-
bers of the Iron Workers' Union were dissident 
members of a 'group' involved in the strike; 
nevertheless they were members of the 'group' 
which was involved in the !Strike. The provisions 
of (d) (1) hereinabove quoted, providing that 
where a strike is fomented by an employee, the 
workers who are o.f his 'grade, clas's, or groulp' 
are ineligible ror benefits serves to make cle•ar 
that the cons·tructi!on here given of the quoted 
words voices t:he legislative intent. It is not only 
those wlvo foment the str'ike or bring it about who 
are. ineligible:, but the. group to wnich such persons 
belong-however imclusive-the grraup for whose 
benefit the svrike is c.alled ... The statute grants 
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an exemption from the general disqualifying pro-
visions 'applicable to persons out of employment 
by reason 'Of a strike, to those who are not directly 
interested in or participating in or financing the 
strike, arrd ·who do not belong to 'a grade or cla;ss 
of ·workers, any of whom participate in, or fi-
nanc~, ur are directly in!terested in the· dispute. 
The Georgia Court of Appeal·s held 'that there 
was 'sufficient evidence to show tha:t claimants 
were disqualified to receive benefits because they 
were interested in the outcome of the strike by 
reason ·of the bearing it had on wages o.f claim-
ants. 'The c'Ourt held it was immaterial whether 
they were members of any union.'' 
We respectfuly submit the Respondents erred in 
granting Uneiillployment Compensation to the Claim-
ants herein 13Jld in charging the accounts 1of the Pelti-
tioners therefur. 
Respeetfully submitted, 
CLYDE, MECHAM & WHITE, 
.AUorneys for Petitioners 
407 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
By Allen E. Mecham 
A tt;O'rney at Law 
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